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Executive Summary 
 
The Secretary of the Senate Committee on Bank Funding Guarantee advised that the 
Committee is interested in having a submission from me on the guarantee scheme.  
Accordingly, I am making this submission.  
 
Soon after the blanket guarantee was announced, I commented on the decision in The 
Australian through two op-eds. I argued that it would accentuate moral hazard and distort 
consumer incentives and risks significantly and suggested that the guarantee be wound back.     
 
In this submission, I elaborate on some of the earlier arguments and also advance a few more 
for consideration by the Committee. The arguments have been supported with relevant data 
and literature. 
 
I argue that the unlimited deposit guarantee was unnecessary and had severe adverse impact 
for smaller financial institutions. These institutions not only lost their share in the deposit 
market but their profit also declined significantly. Major Banks, on the other hand, gained 
considerably. I estimate that the government guarantee has enabled banks (majors in 
particular) to make approx $1.34 billion profit over the next three years – essentially a tax 
payer funded subsidy. 
 
Liquidity in the financial system gravitated and got stored mainly with the banks. The 
guarantee created a liquidity imbalance in the financial system and institutions like the 
Colonial had to freeze withdrawals creating anxiety for several consumers.  Authorities have 
been quoted as saying that the unlimited guarantee was necessary to create confidence among 
consumers and businesses.  Available evidence, however, doesn’t support that there was any 
wide spread confidence problem. 
 
Scrapping the deposit guarantee abruptly will not be prudent.  I suggest that the government 
roll back the deposit guarantee scheme in stages: to $100,000 by December 2009, to $60,000 
by June 2010 and to $20,000 by December 2010.  The government may like to keep it at this 
level as originally planned, though personally, I am not in favour of any explicit guarantee. 
Such a guarantee provides an implicit subsidy.  Australian financial system has worked well 
without any explicit guarantee for years and other financial safety measures are also available. 
 
Though the wholesale funding guarantee had some justification when it was announced, 
global market conditions have generally stabilised and the guarantee may be scrapped as soon 
as possible.  Incidentally, the wholesale funding guarantee has created a number of anomalies.  
 
I have made - and bolded for easy reference- several other comments which may be of interest 
to the Committee.  
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A. Bank Deposit Guarantee 
 
1. Impact on the Australian Financial Sector 
 
When the blanket guarantee was announced on 12 October 2008, it was unprecedented in 
terms of its duration, amount covered, fee and scope.  The duration announced was three years 
(longer than that announced by several other countries), amount of coverage was without limit 
and 100 percent (several countries had put limits on amount and percentage insured), and it 
included both retail and wholesale deposits at all banks (several countries restricted it to retail 
deposits and certain institutions only) and was fee free (several countries had fee in place).   
 
Ten days later, on 22 October 2008, the government announced some changes.  There were to 
be two arrangements now (a) without fee (free) financial claims scheme (scheme) for deposits 
up to $1 million and (b) with fee (paid) large deposits and wholesale funding (LDWF) 
guarantee for deposit balances in excess of $1 million, at a single Authorised Deposit Taking 
Institution (ADTI).  In this submission, a reference to guarantee includes both the claim 
scheme and the LDWF guarantee. 
 
Only nine countries out of 33 OECD countries had unlimited coverage (Schich, 2008).  Of 
these nine, Australia has the unique distinction of announcing an ‘unlimited guarantee’ from a 
‘no guarantee’ situation. Interestingly, Canada which has robust banking system like Australia 
didn’t opt for an unlimited guarantee and countries facing serious banking crisis like the US 
and UK opted for only limited guarantee.  Schich 2008 (Table A2) provides a comparative 
position of the coverage in several OECD countries.   
 
Unlimited guarantees, in particular, increase moral hazard and distort financial flows as 
investor behaviour, incentives and choice of institutions undergo a change.  This was 
confirmed when Colonial and other institutions froze funds withdrawal within days of the 
announcement.  Schich (2008, p.57) warns ‘it is important on efficiency grounds for policy 
makers to carefully assess the potential benefits against the likely cost of policy intervention 
and to refrain from unnecessary activism’. 
 
The impact of blanket guarantee needs to be considered in the context of community 
confidence in the Australian financial system prior to the announcement. Though Lehman 
collapsed on 14 September the Westpac Consumer Sentiment Index actually rose in 
September 2008.  Obviously, at least at that stage Australians were unconcerned and 
considered Lehman as a US problem. RBA governor confirms that there was no evidence of 
any widespread loss of public confidence at that stage. Naturally, when the shocking 
announcement of blanket guarantee was made people might have thought that the government 
has information not available to them which necessitated such an announcement. As a result, 
they lost confidence instead of gaining it as is evidenced by decline in confidence index post 
announcement.  There is reason to believe then that it is the announcement of the guarantee 
that underpinned the changes that took place post guarantee. 
 
The guarantee had a differing impact on several actors within the Australian financial system. 
Major Banks benefitted the most. Smaller financial institutions and foreign banks, in 
particular, lost considerable market share and the guarantee also adversely impacted on their 
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profit.  The guarantee necessitated establishment of the Rudd Bank, financial institutions like 
the Colonial were advised to apply for banking licence so as to seek the guarantee cover, and 
consumers were asked to tap the Centre Link. The decision obviously affected the actors in the 
Australian financial system significantly. 
 
1.1 Credit unions and building societies 
 
Table 1 below shows that despite the guarantee shift in call/demand and term deposits from 
credit unions/ building societies to the banks continued. 
 
Table 1: Change in proportion of Deposits of ADTIs 
 
  Demand  Rise 
over 
Sep08 
 Term  Rise 
over 
Sep08 
 Dec07 Sep08 Dec08  Dec07 Sept08 Dec08  
All banks 95.75 95.96 96.03 0.07 93.67 94.40 94.54 0.14
Credit Unions 3.10 2.99 2.94 -0.05 3.90 3.62 3.55 -0.07
Bldg Socs 1.15 1.05 1.03 -0.02 2.42 1.98 1.91 -0.07
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author from APRA Quarterly Bank Performance Statistics, 2008, 
Dec. - Tables 2, 5, 8 and 11). 
 
Edey (2009, p.1) recently stated that ‘competition was already being eroded because of a 
‘flight to safety’ by clients moving their money to bigger institutions that are perceived as 
more secure, that was occurring before the guarantee was put in place’ (emphasis added).  
 
Granted that the flight to safety was witnessed in earlier quarters, but the guarantee 
couldn’t stabilise it – so the objective of the guarantee to create confidence was not fully 
achieved from the perspectives of small financial institutions. 
 
The RBA governor conceded ‘Australian banks having raised very large quantities of deposits 
in the past couple of months ……..making use of the government guarantee’ (Stevens, 2008, 
p.11). 
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1.2 Foreign banks 
 
The share of foreign bank subsidiaries / branches in the deposit market declined considerably. 
 
Table 1 (a): Market share of deposits held by type of bank ($ million) 
 
Bank 
type 
Dec 07  Sept 08  Dec 08  Col 7- 
Col. 5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Major 931,144 68.59% 1,066,121 70.59% 1,262,135 80.28% 9.69%
Other 
domestic 189,028 13.92% 213,295 14.12% 134,562 8.56% -5.56%
Foreign 
banks 111,522 8.21% 108,936 7.21% 69,558 4.42% -2.79%
Foreign 
Bank 
Branches  125,868 9.27% 121,974 8.08% 106,008 6.74% -1.33%
All 1,357,562 100.00% 1,510,326 100.00% 1572263 100.00% 0.00%
(Source: compiled by the author from APRA Quarterly Bank Performance Statistics, 2008, 
Dec. - Tables 2, 5, 8, 11 and 14). 
 
If St George and BankWest deposits as at the end of September 2008 are adjusted from the 
majors to other domestic banks category then the position is as under: 
 
Table 1 (b): Adjusted market share of various banks ($ million) 
 
Bank type Adjusted Dec 08  Diff (Col 3 – Col 5 of Table 1 (a)) 
1 2 3 4 
Major 1,168,978 74.35% 3.76% 
Other domestic 227,719 14.48% 0.36% 
Foreign banks 69,558 4.42% -2.79% 
Foreign bank 
branches 106,008 6.74% -1.33% 
All banks 1,572,263 100.00% 0.00% 
(Source: compiled by the author from APRA Quarterly Performance Statistics for Dec 2008 - 
Tables 2, 5, 8, 11 and 14). 
 
The loss of share by foreign banks in the deposit market, among others, may have contributed 
to the problems in the financing of commercial property sector by these banks. The 
government then had to announce establishment of the Australian Business Investment 
Partnership (ABIP) - the ‘Rudd Bank’- to overcome the problem. 
 
If the guarantee is now removed abruptly a flight of funds from small financial 
institutions to banks is likely which may endanger the very survival of these institutions. 
Consequently, the deposit guarantee roll back needs to be done with caution. 
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I suggest a roll back of deposit guarantee to $100,000 by end of 2009, to $60,000 by end of 
June 2010 and to $20,000 by December 2010 - and retention at that level thereafter.  It would 
still cover more than 60 percent households (COA, 2004). 
 
1.3  Impact on other financial institutions 
 
One of the major consequences for the non-ADTI sector was the pressure from clients for 
funds withdrawal.  The return on bank deposits became more attractive, with the blanket 
guarantee in place - it was like a risk free return.  
 
The investments in financial institutions such as the Colonial became less attractive and 
liquidity in the financial system started gravitating and getting stored with the ADTIs.  
No wonder the non-ADTIs like the Colonial had to freeze withdrawal of funds. 
Media reports indicated that ‘at least 13 investment funds not covered by the Government's 
guarantee have frozen almost $12 billion in assets, leaving investors unable to withdraw their 
capital’ (AAP, 2008). 
Government intervention in the financial system had the impact of actually sapping consumer 
confidence in financial institutions like the Colonial as risk incentives changed.  
The financial system became more concentrated in the hands of ADTIs during 2008 
which in part could be attributed to the government intervention in the market. 
 
Over the period September to December 2007, the total assets of non-ADTIs declined by 0.66 
percent while assets of the ADTIs rose by 4.69 percent, however, during the corresponding 
period in 2008, the decline was 6.04 percent for non-ADTIs while the rise was 8.40 percent 
for the ADTIs (calculations by the author from RBA, 2009, B1 Statement of assets and 
liabilities). 
 
1.4 Changing the financial landscape 
 
The government refused to extend the guarantee to the non-ADTIs (and rightly so), and 
instead asked the affected financial institutions to apply for a banking licence if they want to 
avail the protection accorded by the blanket guarantee. Further, despite the unlimited deposit 
guarantee to foreign banks, the need to establish the Rudd Bank couldn’t be avoided.  
 
An unintended consequence of the blanket deposit guarantee was the potential it had to 
change the financial landscape of Australia in some way!  
 
1.5 Impact on the non-bank securities market 
 
During the year 2007-08, the non-bank securities market had already started contracting. The 
2008 Australian Financial Markets Report states: 
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‘Trading and issuance of non bank securities has been negatively impacted by the credit 
crunch and consequently borrowers turned to their banks and other markets for funding’ 
(AFMA, 2008, p.14).   
 
The magnitude of this negativity could be seen from the following statistics available in the 
same Report (AFMA, 2008, p.14).  While the annual turnover in bank securities rose from 
$122,679 million (2006-07) to $247,495 million  (2007-08) - rise of 101.7 percent - during the 
same period the turnover in corporate securities declined from $196,632 million to $105,069 
million (decline of 46.6 percent).  
 
Data for the subsequent period is not readily available to do further comparison of the effect of 
bank guarantee announcement in particular. 
 
When businesses were facing credit crunch, it was obvious that providing a bank funding 
guarantee would further skew the market in favour of the bank securities.  With government 
guarantee for banks, it would obviously become hard for others to raise debt. Further as the 
risk free rate was now the rate available on the bank securities (backed by government 
guarantee) funding became potentially more expensive for the businesses.  
 
Yet another consequence was that banks became the sole conduit of financial flows in the 
economy. The process of disintermediation assiduously encouraged by several committees in 
the past got reversed by the stroke of a pen! As a matter of fact precisely at a time when 
businesses needed money to survive (and to retain jobs) they were subjected to the mercy of 
the major banks for financial needs. ABC (2009) quotes Becton Property Group chief 
executive Matthew Chun ‘the greatest challenge facing developers is a lack of available 
credit’.   
 
As per the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), the commercial finance continues to show 
negative growth month over month since October 2008 (ABS, 2008-09). The businesses were 
left to fend for themselves while the banks stored liquidity using government guarantee.  This 
was less than desirable outcome. Intermediated funds would also be costly for businesses than 
funds raised directly from the market.  
  
Table 2: Growth in Lending Finance in 2008-09: Commercial (Month over Month) 
 
2008 2009 
Sept. –Oct  Oct-Nov Nov- Dec Dec -Jan Jan-Feb Feb-Mar 
0.4 -1.6 -1.7 -0.4 -2.6 -1.1 
(Source: ABS (2008 and 2009), Lending Finance, Catalogue 5671 for various moths) 
 
Government intervention actually exacerbated the credit problems of the businesses and also 
raised their borrowing cost.  Table 3 below shows the pass through of interest rates by banks. 
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Table 3: Pass through of interest rates by banks 
 
Date RBA cash 
rate 
Weighted variable interest 
rate (under $2 million) 
Excess interest charged by 
the banks over the cash rate 
3 Sept. 2008 7.00 10.0 3.00 
8 Oct. 2008 6.00   
5 Nov. 2008 5.25   
3 Dec. 2008 4.25 8.5 4.25 
4 Feb. 2009 3.25   
8 Apr. 2009 3.00 7.4 4.40 
(Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2008 and 2009), Statement D08 Bank Lending to 
Business: Selected Statistics and A02 Monetary Policy Changes). 
The banks, however, refused to pass on the rate cut to the businesses or households. ‘National 
Australia Bank has raised the ire of the government by refusing to pass on any of the RBA's 
reduction’ (Thelwell and Fagg, 2009).   
It is important to note as has been explained later that the interest rate spread of major banks 
actually rose by 21 basis points in the six months to June 2009. This was largely because of 
the government guarantee available at much lower cost (70 basis points) than available in 
other countries and the significant increase in the deposits due again to fee free deposit 
guarantee. 
Yet, the reason given by banks for not giving full pass through was rising cost of funding. 
‘NAB ……cited the bank's rising cost of funding as preventing it from passing on any of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia's 25 basis point reduction……’ (Thelwell and Fagg, 2009). 
2. Impact on interest rates 
 
As deposits gravitated to ADTIs, the excess supply coupled with government guarantee 
brought down the interest rates and so the return to the depositors significantly. 
 
2.1 Reduced return on deposits 
 
The interest rate on $10,000 online savings account was 7.30 percent in August 2008 but 
declined to 4.60 percent in December 2008 and further to 3.15 percent by April 2009 (RBA 
Bulletin Statistical Tables, 2009, F 4).  
 
The reduced interest rates would have adversely impacted the return to depositors. 
 
2.2 Reduced funding cost for banks 
 
Deposit guarantee generated excess supply of deposits and reduced interest rates would have 
helped bring down funding costs of the ADTIs.  In addition, the banks had wholesale funding 
guarantee to raise funds from the debt market at a lower fee (compared with banks in other 
countries), favourably impacting the funding cost. 
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Consequently, the banks benefitted significantly in comparison to small financial 
institutions especially credit unions.  
 
This can be vouched from the decline in the ratio of interest expenses to total liabilities in 
December 2008 as compared to September 2008 quarter. The ratio of interest expenses to total 
liabilities (QOQ for Dec 2008) showed a decline of 0.27 percent for the banks and 0.11 
percent for the credit unions.  
 
Table 4: Ratio of Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities in 2008 (Quarter ending) 
 
 June  September December Col. 4 – Col. 3. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Banks 1.45 1.45 1.18 0.27 
Credit unions 1.34 1.43 1.32 0.11 
(Source: Compiled by the author from APRA Quarterly Statistics of Banks, Credit Union and 
Building Society Performance, 2008, December) 
 
The deposit guarantee resulted in large financial flows from the non-ADTIs and other ADTIs 
to the banks. In addition, the government guarantee to raise debt in international market, 
significantly increased total assets of banks and lowered those of smaller financial institutions 
as can be seen from the following Table.  
 
Table 5: Change in proportion of assets held by ADTIs ($ million) 
 
 Dec 07 Dec 08 
All Banks 2,161,322 97.26% 2,671,649 97.63%
Credit unions 39,449 1.78% 44,011 1.61%
Bldg Societies 21,437 0.96% 20,982 0.77%
Total 2,222,208 100.00% 2,736,642 100.00%
(Source: Compiled by the author from RBA Bulletin Statistical Tables B2, 7 and 8) 
 
The table above indicates that the proportion of total assets held by all banks in the total assets 
of all ADTIs increased while that of the smaller financial institutions declined. 
 
The share of major banks as a proportion of assets of all banks has also increased from 84% 
(Dec 07) to 91% (Dec 08) – calculated separately by the author.  One can’t say though that the 
government guarantee was the sole reason given that the assets of St George and BankWest 
are now included in the major banks category.  
 
Small financial institutions are increasingly getting marginalised in the Australian 
financial system.  
 
As and when a fresh financial system inquiry is launched by the government, this aspect will 
need to be considered. 
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3. Impact on consumer and business confidence 
 
It has been contended that the rationale behind the blanket guarantee was to create confidence 
among the consumers and businesses. ‘The aim was to get something simple out there to 
regain confidence’ (Edey, 2009, p.2).  The evidence presented in the following paragraphs 
indicates that the objective was far from being achieved. 
 
3.1 Consumer confidence  
 
The loss of consumer confidence was not as wide spread as was being made out.  The RBA 
Governor stated ‘Some in the community were worrying …..it certainly was not widespread..’ 
(Stevens 2009, p. 18).  Let the Westpac-Melbourne Institute Consumer Sentiment Index tell 
the story (Table 6). 
Table 6: Consumer Sentiment Index in later half of 2008 
Month Index Month Index Month Index 
July 2008 79.0 October 82.0 Jan 2009 94.9 
August 86.2 November 85.5 Feb.  85.8 
September 92.2 December 92.0 March  85.6 
(Source: RBA 2009 Indicators of Spending and Confidence)  
Lehman failed in mid September 2008, yet the index actually rose in the months leading up to 
the announcement of the guarantee. It fell in October 2008 when the guarantee and the 
stimulus package were announced. Probably the dramatic announcement woke the consumers 
up only to lose confidence as can be seen from the table.  Even in December 2008 – three 
months after the guarantee announcement - the index continued to linger at a level lower than 
the September 2008 level.  
Interestingly, in April 2001 –the Dot Com bust year –the index fell to 90.2, and during the  
Asian crisis years, it fell to 94.0 (June 1998) yet the government of the day didn’t feel the need 
to ‘get something simple out there’ to restore consumer confidence. 
A question that begs an answer is how the authorities in the UK or the US could build 
the necessary confidence without resorting to a blanket guarantee while the authorities in 
Australia couldn’t.  
These countries faced worst economic situation - even the semblance of which was not seen in 
Australia. It appears that unlimited guarantee was a case of ‘policy-making under pressure’.  
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Obviously, the Australian Government overreacted.  This is further confirmed when one looks 
at the trend of bank deposits in the months closer to the announcement of the guarantee. 
Table 7:  Monthly trend of deposits of all banks in 2008 ($ billion) 
Month Deposits Month Deposits 
May 1,194 Sept 1,280 
June 1,216 Oct 1,306 
July 1,227 Nov 1,324 
August 1,249 Dec 1,326 
(Source: RBA Bulletin Statistics, 2008, Statement B03 Banks-Liabilities) 
The evidence presented above, doesn’t support the claim that community confidence in 
the Australian financial system was so low that it needed a blanket deposit guarantee, 
unless the government had some other sources of information to measure confidence. 
 
We take pride that the Australian prudential regulation framework and well capitalised/ well 
managed banks saved us from the financial tsunami.  However, we forget that it was the 
budget surpluses of prior years and low current account deficit that has put Australia in good 
shape.  ‘The current account deficit narrowed to a seven year low of 2.2% of GDP at the end 
of 2008, driven by a trade surplus’ (Government of Australia, 2009, p. 14). The US, UK, 
Ireland and other countries had large current account deficits and funds were flowing from 
countries like China especially to the US in search of yield (FSA, 2009).  Flush with funds, 
banks in the US resorted to sub-prime lending.   
 
If Australia faces similar situation, I am afraid the risk appetite of Australian banks too would 
increase. Banks now know that the government would rescue depositors anyway. ‘The 
financial industry is always short-sighted and always in denial……they always think they're 
very clever and have good risk-assessment, but they always repeat old behaviour patterns’ 
(Kiander quoted in Todd, 2009).  
 
In future, if depositors (both retail and wholesale) see any risk of loosing their deposits, 
pressure would mount on the government in power to revive the blanket deposit guarantee and 
that too uncapped with 100 percent cover citing the precedent now set by the government.  
 
The unprecedented action of blanket guarantee was an unnecessary activism and gave 
rise to unwanted signalling effects on the Australian financial system.  
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3.2 Business confidence 
 
Business confidence was on the decline the world over as well as in Australia particularly after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  But did the blanket guarantee help 
restore it?  As can be seen from the table below, the business confidence index actually 
improved in September 2008 compared to June 2008 (though continued to be negative). 
However, it was substantially lower in December 2008 quarter even though the guarantee and 
the stimulus measures were in place.  These measures couldn’t restore the index to September 
2008 quarter level.  
 
Of course, one can argue that without these actions, the index could have dipped even further 
and the measures helped stem its slide below -30.5. But such propositions can’t be tested. 
 
Table 8: NAB business confidence index in later half of 2007-08 (Quarter ending) 
 
 Index  Index 
Dec-07 5.8 Sep-08 -6.6 
Mar-08 -4.2 Dec-08 -30.5 
Jun-08 -7.5 Mar-09 -24 
(Source: RBA 2009 Indicators of Spending and Confidence). 
In September 1998 (Asian Crisis) the index was -5.6 and it was -23.7 in December 1990 
(recession in Australia) - the worst ever in pre-global financial crisis years - and yet the 
government of the day didn’t think it was necessary to introduce a blanket guarantee to restore 
business confidence. 
The Reserve Bank Governor commented as under about business confidence ‘.. turned 
abruptly much weaker in October, and remained weak thereafter (Graph 1). There was some 
recovery in March. (The behaviour of Australian household confidence surveys has not been 
as weak, as I shall come to later). While official data are yet to show it, it is likely that 
business investment spending is in the process of declining sharply. Hiring intentions have 
been scaled back quickly. Residential investment and exports have fallen’ (Stevens, 2009, 
Road to Recovery).  
 
Thus, even six months after the announcement of blanket guarantee, the business confidence 
index languishes at much worse levels than the September 2008 level when the stated 
intention of the government was ‘to get something simple out their to restore confidence’ 
(emphasis added). 
 
There was no need of a blanket guarantee as the consumer confidence wasn’t even below 
some of its worst levels in the past. It was also ineffective to build business confidence 
back to the September 2008 level six months after. 
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4. Impact on government contingent liabilities 
 
It is unlikely that the deposit guarantee would get invoked given the robust banking system in 
Australia and recent indications that overseas financial situation is stabilising.  However, an 
abrupt withdrawal of deposit guarantee could trigger financial flows from small institutions to 
major banks. This may have the potential to bring some of these institutions in serious 
financial difficulties necessitating the reinstatement of the guarantee.   
 
4.1 Fee free deposit guarantee  
 
The Australian premium (fee) free guarantee up to $1 million was also unique feature when 
compared to other countries.  Several other countries levied premium on the deposit guarantee. 
 
Table 9: Percentage premium rate on deposit insurance  
 
Country Premium Country Premium 
USA 0.05-0.43 Philippines 0.2 
HK 0.05-0.14 Singapore 0.03-0.08 
India 0.1 Taiwan 0.02-0.07 
Indonesia 0.2 Thailand 0.4 
Japan 0.083-0.115 Vietnam 0.15 
Korea 0.1-0.3   
(Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 2008) 
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B. Wholesale funding guarantee 
 
The wholesale funding guarantee was needed to match similar arrangements proposed in other 
countries so as to establish a level playing field and help Australian banks seek funding at 
competitive cost.   
Bank guarantee generated significant profits for banks in the US. ‘The government's guarantee 
since November on new debt issued by financial firms such as Citigroup Inc. and General 
Electric Co. will save those companies about $24 billion in borrowing costs during the next 
three years’ (WSJ, 2009, July 28).  
The lower fee contributed significantly to bank profits in the US and the case would be similar 
here in Australia as the fee charged by the government on the wholesale funding guarantee is 
even lower as compared to the US. 
The estimates of such government guarantee generated bank profits are not available in 
Australia. I have, however, made an attempt to compute the likely gains for Australian banks. 
As major banks were the main issuers of the debt the analysis is largely applicable to them. 
5. Estimating bank profits from government guarantee 
 
One of the ways to compute the profit would be to check the savings made by banks in 
borrowing costs due to government guarantee.  The saving would be equal to, the without 
guarantee rate prevailing in the market minus the rate actually paid by banks plus the 
guarantee fee.  I use an alternative method. 
 
As per the KPMG Financial Institutions Performance Survey (2009) the interest spread of 
majors increased from 167 basis points (December 2008) to 188 basis points (June 2009).  The 
excess interest spread of 21 basis points could be attributed to lower borrowing cost of banks 
due to the government guarantee.  Banks (mainly the majors) raised about $106 billion 
government guaranteed debt by June 2009 (Australian Government, 2009, LDWF Guarantee 
Statistics).   
 
Assuming that the entire debt was raised on 1 January 2009, the profit made by the banks 
(mostly by major banks) is about $223 million ($106 b x 21 bps) in six months to June 2009.   
 
The excess operating profit after tax made by banks in half year to June 2009 as compared to 
half year to June 2008 was $719 million ($8,949 million - $8,230 million).  Assuming other 
factors constant, nearly 32 percent of the profit ($223 million / $719 million) could be 
attributed largely to the lower cost of debt due to the government guarantee. 
 
Nearly 90 percent of the $106 billion wholesale funding was for long term. As at the end of 
June 2009, Government issued 310 certificates under the guarantee of these 147 were for 3 
year period ending 2012, 48 for 4 years ending 2013, and 75 for 5 years ending 2014.  The 
remaining 41 were for periods two years or less.   
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We assume the entire debt was raised for a three year period.  Accordingly, the total profit by 
banks would be of the order of $1.34 billion ($223 million x 6) over three years.   
 
This excludes the profits that the banks could have generated by attracting enormous amount 
of deposits at lower rates following the deposit guarantee announcement.  The table below 
provides an estimate of the excess deposits attracted by major banks due to the government 
guarantee. 
 
Table 9:  Deposits of major banks ($ billion) 
 
Month Deposits Growth rate Excess Deposits Excess Deposits 
Sept 2007 861   Due to  
Dec 2007 931 8.13 70 Guarantee 
Mar 2008 949 1.93 18  
Jun 2008  985 3.79 36  
Sept 2008 1066 8.22 81  
Dec 2008 1262 18.38 196 115 
(Source for deposits: APRA Quarterly Performance Statistics as above) 
 
Deposits of major banks grew by 18 percent in December 2008 quarter as against by 8 percent 
in September 2008 quarter ((The figures of growth rate in corresponding period in 2007 were 
also 8 percent).  The excess growth of 10 percent or $115 billion could be attributed to the 
government guarantee.  However, as deposit balances fluctuate quite often, it may be hard to 
compute the profit made by the major banks on the excess deposits – something which APRA 
or RBA may like to attempt and are in a better position to determine. 
  
Putting it another way, $1.34 billion is a tax payer funded subsidy for banks – mainly the 
majors which are the main issuers of the debt. Interestingly, the majors were not 
prepared to pass on the rate cut citing higher funding costs as already indicated earlier. 
 
The subsidy is a windfall for banks and this taxpayer funded subsidy would be used eventually 
to pay dividends to bank shareholders and compensation to bank executives! 
 
6. Anti-competitive pricing  
 
Issues have been raised about comparatively lower fee charged by the government to 
Australian banks. Australian government charges a fee of 70 basis points while the US which 
charged 75 basis points for its banks have now raised it to 125 basis points (Stutchbury, 2009, 
p. 10).  
 
While the major banks benefitted the most from the government guarantee (they largely raised 
the debt and that too at lower fee), the smaller financial institutions were actually put to a 
disadvantage. The regional banks were required to pay a fee of 150 basis points on wholesale 
funding as against 70 basis points for the majors.  This would directly impact the interest 
spread of the domestic banks and consequently their profitability.   
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KPMG (Update 2009, p.3) states ‘The regionals, credit unions and building society sectors all 
experienced lower profitability in the 2009 financial year to date’.  
 
The fee structure accorded preferential treatment to major banks, when all banks - including 
the majors – were experiencing liquidity crunch.  
 
KPMG (Update 2009, p.4) rightly points out ‘this has a direct impact on their ability to 
compete with the majors and is at least part of the reason behind the regional’s 68% decrease 
in net profit after tax compared to the increase in the majors’ profits in the most recent half 
year results’. 
 
Edey (2009, July 29) is quoted by media as saying that such risk-based pricing was a 
deliberate feature of the system. The argument could be acceptable in a normal situation. 
However, the financial dislocation was faced by all banks - including the majors- consequently 
the US policy of charging a fee based on the term of the instrument would have been more 
equitable.   Applying risk-based pricing in an abnormal situation was discriminatory against 
smaller financial institutions. 
 
Government intervention seems to have resulted in increase in profits of the major banks 
and a significant reduction in profits of smaller financial institutions. 
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C. Concluding remarks 
 
The blanket guarantee announcement could have far reaching consequences for the Australian 
financial system.   
 
Major banks gained significantly while foreign banks, regional banks, credit unions and 
building societies lost not only their market share but also experienced decline in profit.  The 
wholesale funding guarantee alone brought a windfall profit of approx. $1.34 billion to 
Australian banks –mainly the majors.   
 
The government needs to consider whether the banks could be allowed to retain such tax payer 
funded subsidy and how best the tax payer could be rewarded for providing this assistance to 
our major banks. 
 
The guarantee hastened the erosion in competition in the deposit market at the peril of small 
institutions like credit unions and building societies.  Liquidity in the financial system was 
gravitating and getting stored mainly with the banks which led to extreme action by 
institutions like the Colonial to freeze withdrawal and created anxiety for consumers at least at 
that point in time.   
 
In sum, the unlimited deposit guarantee did more harm than good to the Australian financial 
system. It was unnecessary activism on the part of the government and the decision was 
probably made without adequate consultation. It would have long term repercussions as moral 
hazard issues become most relevant when the deposit insurance is unlimited.  
 
 The deposit guarantee needs to be rolled back in stages while the wholesale funding guarantee 
needs to be scrapped as soon as possible.  
 
 
(Acknowledgement:  I acknowledge that the submission greatly benefitted from the comments 
on earlier version received from Mrs Suneeta Sathye, Lecturer at the University of Canberra, a 
former central bank employee and my wife). 
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